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POLICE AND LAW IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY*
JEROME HALLt

STANDARDS

If we wish to understand and improve police service, we must first
recognize that the limitations and abuses in law enforcement which alarm
and challenge us are neither novel nor peculiarly American. The ancient
Greeks tortured slaves prior to their testifying in court; the Romans
added foreigners and, later, they permitted the torture of even Roman
citizens in cases of murder and treason.' The Middle Ages, steeped in
religious spirituality, raised the art of coercing confessions to new
heights. In colonial Massachusetts women were executed as witches.
And English history is full of brutal mob action against foreigners and
religious minorities.
Do not think that this is dead history-a bloody page of uncivilized
times. Only a decade ago millions of defenseless human beings were
murdered by the German police in a calculated revival of all the diabolical
instruments of torture that twisted ingenuity has contrived. Far exceeding even those abominations are the scientific tortures and enslavement
of literally millions of human beings by the NKVD in Russia and
Siberia, beside which the limitation of civil liberties in democratic states
pales into insignificance.
A broad outline of certain aspects of so-called human nature has
been sketched above not to minimize the evil of race antagonism, but to
encourage persistent realistic dealing with perennial problems. The
outline could be filled in with horrible accounts of murder, rape, pillage,
*This paper consists of three public lectures delivered at the University of
Chicago Law School on July 15, 22, and 23, 1952, as part of a conference on Police
and Racial Tensions.

t Professor of Law, Indiana University. Author of several books and numerous
articles on criminal law and legal philosophy; Editor, 20th Century Legal Philosophy
Series; Member, American Law Institute's Advisory Committee on a Model Penal Code.
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JARDINE, THE USE OF TORTURE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 2

(1837),
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riot and robbery-until any decent person would rebel, satiated with
disgust at the cruelty, intolerance, violence, and cupidity of self-styled
horno sapiens. In appraising the police functions, it must be remembered
that the first job of a policeman is to protect the citizens' lives and that
police officers are ordinary human beings. If we keep these facts in
mind, we shall not look for an easy panacea, but we may be able to
understand what happens when undisciplined men, as police officers, deal
with suspected rapists, murderers, traitors, and helpless foreigners.
What must be added to the outline, however, is far more important,
namely, that human beings have also captured visions of truth and
goodness and have proved capable even of self-sacrifice. In the United
States millions of ordinary persons have achieved something new and
infinitely valuable in history-a continental democracy, a working fusion
of liberty and order, and the implementation of these ard other enduring
values in political institutions. My purpose is to inquire how we can
help, by a wise exercise of police functions, to preserve our democracy,
remove existing strains and tensions, and advance our civilization by
sharing its values with the weaker members of the community-those
who, of all our citizens, have the strongest claims upon a democracy.
The greatest obstacle to understanding the police problem is the
specialization of police functions, and that is also the major handicap in
the way of reform. At the same time, it is obvious that there are
important advantages in specialized services, certainly in those performed
by metropolitan police. Accordingly, in an effort to understand the
basic elements of the police problem, specialization of the police service
must be placed in a correct perspective.
Our familiar type of city police organization dates from 1829, when
(cSirf--bert Peel nally persuaded a fearful Parliament to enact his Bill
for a Metropolitan Police.2 Merchants and shopkeepers, as well as
political leaders, had long opposed the creation of a force which in
unscrupulous hands might become the instrument of tyranny. 3 Even
the onslaught of unbridled mobs and frenzied riots, destructive of vast
amounts of property, including the homes of distinguished judges, met
a persistent stand against a strong police force which might damage
English liberties. But by 1829 insecurity from riots and organized
2. LxEE, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND C. 12 (1901); Hall, Legal and Social
Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARv. L. REv. 566, 578-589 (1936).
3. The parliamentary committee which opposed Peel's earlier bill reported, ".
that forfeiture or curtailment of individual liberty which the creation of an effective
police system would bring with it would be too great a sacrifice on behalf of improvements in police or facilities in detection of crime." REITH, BRITiSH POLICE AND TIE
DEmOCRATIC IDEAL 28 (1943).
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gangsters exceeded even the fear of tyrannical police, and Peel's bill
became law. 4 A new police force, the Bobbies or Peelers, became a
fact. Our city police are the heirs of that-London organization.
Because we have not understood how recent professional police
services are and since even less is known about their antecedents, the
misapprehension prevails in this country that the citizen need play no
part in police services, that that task belongs exclusively to the publicly
employed police officers. "Theirs is the job, for which they are paid;
theirs is the exclusive obligation. Thus in our common thinking a high
wall separates the police from the public. This is the basic American
fallacy, the current myth, which must be exposed if progress is to be
made. Even among relatively advanced thinkers in this field, insight
has carried only to the point of recognizing the dependence of successful
police work on the cooperation of the public since there can never be
enough police in a democracy to do the job themselves. Important as
that insight is, we must push far beyond it if we are to understand the
role of the police is a democratic society. We must grasp the fact that
in a democracy the obligation to do police work rests on every citizen
and that the existence of a professional force does not in the least alter
that duty, but only facilitates its skillful discharge. In order to evaluate
these assertions it is necessary to understand the police functions prior
to the creation of the London metropolitan force.
A glance back a thousand years to Anglo-Saxon England reveals
the embryo of a democratic police force in a simple fact-every ablebodied freeman was a policeman. They were divided into groups of
ten, the leader being called the "tithingman." Each member of the group
was responsible for the peaceful conduct of all the other members and
he also participated in the arrest of local offenders. This was the system
of frankpledge, collective security. For the efficient discharge of his
police duties, every male from 15 to 60 was required to maintain certain
arms and equipment according to his wealth. On the "hue and cry"
being raised, every man within earshot was required to drop whatever
he was doing and join in the pursuit, echoing the cry until the posse
closed in around the criminal. Not to join in the search was a serious
offense, and there were collective fines imposed upon localcommunities
for-Tailure to perform police functions efficiently. The constable succeeded the tithingman as the chief peace officer but the job continued to
be unpaid and was filled in rotation by the parishioners. Later, the
justice of the peace became both judge and police official who, even in
4. 10 GEO. 4, c,44 (1829).
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modern times, discharged active police duties, especially in the suppression of riots.5 Thus we see the origin also of judicial control of the
police and the emergence of the police as the instrument of the judiciary.
With the growth of towns, the various local councils employed
watchmen for full-time service. But this did not relieve the common
citizenry of what had become firmly recognized legal duties to perform
police functions. By the seventeenth century this medieval police system
was, however, being severely strained. The parish constables, being
unremunerated, sought to escape duty. Persons who made no attempt
to avoid their obligation to serve as peace officers frequently manipulated
the job to further their private interests. Watch and Ward became
intolerably inefficient as the towns grew into cities, and in London the
need was especially great for skilled forces to deal with the gangsters
who, by the first half of the 18th century, had become the terror of both
city and countryside.
Sir John Fielding, a Police Magistrate, then organized the Bow
Street Runners, a corps of regularly paid officers which amazed London
by their capture of notorious gangs of criminals. The effectiveness of
this small group of officers-there were only about 50 of themundoubtedly helped persuade Parliament that there was merit in Peel's
bill. However, it is important to remember that the new police force
was not the child of Parliament, but developed from ancient institutions,
close to the practices and habits of the people.
New York copied Peel's London police plan i18,nd
during the
next ten years similar police establishments were set up in Chicago,
Philadelphia, and Boston." There was initial opposition by the police to
wearing uniforms, and policemen were at first purely political appointees.
But by 1870 the essential features of the London Metropolitan Police
had taken firm roots in a number of American cities.
The suspicion directed toward a numerous uniformed police by
Englishmen apprehensive of their civil liberties happily dissolved in the
evidence that the police functions were discharged not only with efficiency
but with respect for the legal rights of all classes, including suspected
criminals. Thus, in the light of the above history it is not difficult to
understand the English saying that a policeman is merely a person who
is paid to do what it is his duty as a citizen to do without pay.
Perhaps the strongest evidence supporting this conception is provided in the law on arrest. We have been told by many writers that
5. LEE, op. cit. supra note 2, cc. 1, 2, 3.
6. FoSDICI, AmEEICAN POLICE SysTEis c. 2 ('1921).
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there was a basic common law difference between the right of a lay
citizen to arrest for felony and that of a police officer to do so, namely,
that in the former instance the felony must in fact have been committed.
But in the 17th century treatise by Dalton, instead of discussing arrest
by peace officers, the author speaks of "every private person," .every
man," "any man." Then follows one sentence only regarding officers:
"The Sherife, Bailifes, Constables, and other of the Kings Officers may
arrest and imprison offenders, in all cases where a private person
may.. . . "7 This order of topics, the emphasis upon arrest by "every
man," and selection of the "private person" as the standard by which
the right of officers to arrest is measured, are significant when contrasted
to the usual version presented in modern treatises.
Blackstone tells us that

"...

in case of felony actually committed,

or a dangerous wounding whereby felony is like to ensue, a constable
may upon probable suspicion arrest the felon." And on the page immediately following he states: "Upon probable suspicion also a private
*"8 Thus, as late as 1765 any difference
person may arrest the felon ..
between the right of laymen and that.f police officers was not even
hinted at. Indeed, it was not un ilt 1827-that the rule differentiating the
legal powers of lay persons rom that of peace officers was established.
After that a constable could arrest when he had reasonable gio-ind to
suspect that a felony had been committed, although none had, in fact,
been committed. 9 This enlargement of the officers' powers, however,
was not accompanied by any lessening of those of laymen. That, together with the recency of any difference at all, underlines the historic
participation of the general population in police service.
In addition to the history of police in England and the lack of
distinction in traditional law between the legal powers of police officers
and lay citizens until 1827, there is important evidence of civilian discharge of police functions in the numerous private law-enforcing agencies
that have existed in England since the eleventh century. Although active
police work by lay citizens naturally narrowed as the professionals took
over this function, many private protective organizations flourished. By
1839, ten years after the organization of Peel's Metropolitan Police,
7. DALTON,

THE CouNTRY JUSTICE

413-416 (6th ed. 1643).

8. 4 BL. Comm.* 292, 293.
9. In Beckwith v. Philby, 6 B. & C. 638, 639, 108 Eng. Rep. 585, 586 (K. B. 1827),
Lord Tenderden stated: "There is this distinction between a private individual and a
constable: in order to justify the former in causing the -imprisonment of a person, he

must not only make out a reasonable ground of suspicion, but he must prove that a
felony has actually been committed; whereas a constable having reasonable ground to
suspect that a felony has-been committed, is authorized to detain the party suspected

until inquiry can be made by the proper authorities."
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"there were upwards of five hundred voluntary associations for promoting the apprehension and prosecution of felons ... ."1o They consisted of three general types: a representative cross-section of the
community; merchants and property owners who wished to safeguard
their special interests; and self-nominated "thief-catchers."
A much wider participation by laymen-in legislative and judicial
functions, as well as in police services-occurred in the early history of
our western states. Particularly significant is the California Gold Rush
in 1849, which engendered numerous conflicts over land and a wave of
criminality consisting chiefly of murder and theft. This situation
occasioned the organization of popular tribunals, councils, and vigilance
committees-indeed, the general participation of the entire community
in the law-enforcement process." These lay organizations have persisted
in our present society; indeed many of them have become even more
specialized than the police. Hundreds of industries and businesses have
their own protective association. Insurance and surety companies play
large parts in law enforcement, including crime prevention and the
detection, arrest, and conviction of criminals.
We must now take account of another fundamental fact-the
universality of police functions. Every society, primitive or advanced,
has had and now has its police. The reason is simple and basic-every
society depends for its survival upon the maintenance of order in the
community. Every society has disruptive, antagonistic, aggressive forces
within it which must be controlled, not sporadically but regularly and
persistently. That was obviously true in England; and we have noted
the spontaneous emergence of police in California immediately after the
Gold Rush. Plato's detailed discussion of police would emphasize the
point. But for a final, especially significant illustration we may note the
typical organization of police societies among the American Indians.
Studies of Indian tribes suggest the origin of both criminal law and
police in the need to maintain order in the buffalo hunt, upon the success
of which depended the food supply. The buffalo hunt was a community
enterprise which required planning, careful strategy, and precise execution. Anyone who was not adequately equipped or was premature in
shooting or who otherwise interfered with the plan and method of th(
hunt was a serious offender. A picked group of men, chosen for theii
prowess in war and in the hunt, were both soldiers and policemen, fol
10. Bowen, Progress in the Administration of Justice During the Victorian Period
1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 516, 554 (1907).
11. For a discussion of lay participation in the law enforcement'process, see HALI
THEFT, LAW, AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1952).
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effectiveness in war depended in no small degree upon the maintenance
2
of order within the group.'
It is very likely that in every society disorder has been a threat
to survival, hence a permanent problem, and that organized police forces
have functioned everywhere and at all times to maintain order principally
by preventing crimes and apprehending offenders. Thus, it is highly
probable that the functions of police are permanent universal aspects of
social organization.
But if police represent a normal, necessary phase of community
living, it does not follow in the least that there is only one kind of police
or that police functions are everywhere discharged in the same ways.
On the contrary, it is only a small step from the relation of police
functions to social organization to the realization that police reflect the
general culture of the society they represent, e. g., ".

.

. the posse is

unknown in Germany."' 3 This, to be sure, is an oversimplification of a
complex matter because there are antinomies and cross-currents in all
societies. It is useful for our present purposes, however, because it takes
us directly to the current question of police in a democratic society as
contrasted with police in a dictatorship.
The description of the English police service, as merely the specialized, skilled, full-time performance of the duties of all citizens, underlines
the principal difference. It exhibits self-rule on the police level, selfpolicing, as opposed to being policed by a force that is entirely free from
public control. That is the central insight into the vital differences. But
this question must be considered in some detail if the precise differences
in police institutions are to be discovered.
At no time in history has it been easier to compare the police of
democratic societies with that of dictatorships. The fascist dictatorships
of Italy and Germany are fresh in our memory and the Iron Curtain
cannot conceal the ugly facts of Communist tyranny. The refugees from
these countries, bearing the horrible scars of police violence, are living
witnesses of the character of the dictator's police. The concentration
12.

Among the Plains Indians, the powers of the police societies included control

of the tribal buffalo hunt, the movement of the camp, settlement of personal disputes,
maintenance of order during ceremonies, and the conduct of war. For premature attacks
on the buffalo, police inflicted corporal punishment, confiscated the game, destroyed the
property of the offenders, and in extreme cases they were authorized to kill them. In
the discharge of their daily duties, the police societies prevented violations of tribal law,

protected property, directed public works construction, and administered punishment.
Humphrey, Police and Tribal Welfare in Plains Indians Culthres, 33 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 147 (1942).
13. Wolff, Criminal Justice in Germany, 42 MIcH. L. Rzv. 1067, 1083 (1944).
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camps operated by the Gestapo achieved systematic proficiency in the
degradation of the human spirit. 14 It does not require any eloquence
to portray Gestapo and NKVD torture of human beings in a way that
would revolt any decent person and persuade him that there is no limit
to the depravity to which human nature is capable of descending.
However, it is a startling fact that there is hardly a single physical
brutality inflicted by the Gestapo and the NKVD which American policemen have not at some time perpetrated. 15 Certainly the torture of
Negroes by the police in some communities rivals the barbarism of the
Gestapo and NKVD. It is true that our police are not scientific about
torture; their crudeness would incur the contempt of NKVD inquisitors.
The inventors of psychological constraint that can drive normal persons
to utter despair and persuade even the heroes of the Revolution, the "old
Bolsheviks," to confess that they are traitors, must regard American
third degrees as uncouth exhibits of a superficial culture. It is, of
course, true that the brutality of American police falls short of the
calculated barbarism of the secret police of modern dictators, and that it
is relatively infrequent. But these are matters of degree. Hence, we
are left with the unavoidable question, what essential differences, if any,
are there between American police and the Gestapo or NKVD? An easy
answer to this question would be that the brutality of American police
is exceptional while that of dictatorial police is normal and expected.
But such a reply would leave the superficial impression that there is no
basic difference between the two police systems. It would also cloud the
character of democratic police because sensitive aristocrats also abhor
the use of torture. Accordingly, while wholesale torture and democracy
obviously cannot co-exist, the essential criteria of the police of democratic
society cannot be determined by that single test.
The basic feature of the police of dictator-states is that they are the
chief physical instrument of political domination. To an American,
14. The Tribune of Lausanne on December 26, 1943, reported: ".

.

. a Swiss ob-

server declared at the end of 1943: 'One after another priests, clergymen, professors
and intellectuals, all men whose education rendered them most capable of keeping alive
their national traditions and what is called the European spirit, were systematically
eliminated, as well as workers, the bourgeoisie and the peasants. The same harsh methods
continually recurred: Mass arrests, the shooting of hostages without trial, the deportation of men and women under conditions of the greatest hardship and even without
taking the trouble to prove their guilt. That is what happened to Poles, Czechs, Belgians,
the students of Oslo University, and to many others, as well as to professors and students
of Strasbourg University, who were attacked suddenly at the end of their lectures
without anyone bothering to explain to them the crimes of which they were accused,
while they became the objects of brutalities by the police.'" BRAmsTsT, DiCTATORSHiP
AND POLITICAL POLICE 155 (1945).
15. HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE (1931) ; Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, 11
NAT. COM1,1. ON LAW OBSER. AND ENFORCEMENT (1931).
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"political police" suggests a small detail of officers assigned to the detection of treason and other subversive crimes. That, however, does not
begin to characterize such organizations as the Gestapo and NKVD.
In a dictatorship, the formula is, "no private life is permitted." Politics
include the slightest hint of disagreement--even a remark within the
family circle might be the ground for commitment to a concentration or
slave camp. Police spies in Russia literally run to the hundreds of
thousands. In every factory and business concern in the land, among
office workers and in the schools and universities, among the political
employees, including the Party members themselves and, not least, in the
army and in the police department itself, spies and informers are warp
and woof of dictatorial control. 1 6
Preventive, anticipatory detention is a wholesale police operation.
It does not wait upon overt conduct, even of the most incipient type.
It is the job of the political police to discover what transpires in the
hearts of men; indeed, use of the provocateur has been a tried technique
since the time of Napoleon's Chief of Police. An Italian fascist Chief
of Police would organize a gang of thugs, assault an anti-fascist, then
donning his police uniform, he would arrest an innocent fascist who, of
course, easily proved an alibi. But that was mere battery and mayhem.
The ORVA arrested "socially dangerous" persons, tried, exiled, or
executed them without any resort to law or courts.
Nor are such tactics confined to persons who on some rational
ground are suspected of latent hostility to the regime. To dominate the
public absolutely, to engender abject submission, terror is employed as
propaganda and as a deliberate instrument of control. Thousands of
innocent persons must be sacrificed in order to develop attitudes of fear
and awe. And, since every human organization contains the seeds of
discontent, the dictator must conduct periodic purges. Thus Hitler
ruthlessly liquidated Roehm and other leading Nazis, and Stalin executed
most of the original Bolshevik leaders. Gestapo and NKVD were' the
instruments employed to fabricate the evidence and to make sure that
confessions and convictions were duly secured. The NKVD' 7 is essential
to the maintenance of the Communist regime, just as was the Gestapo
16. See BRAMSTEDT, op. cit. supra note 14; FRAENxEL, THE DUAL STATE (1941).
17. The wide functions of the NKVD include supervision of construction of highways and canals, mostly by forced labor of ordinary criminals, Kulaks, political enemies,
and various national groups. It checks and purges the Army, arresting high officers,
and itself possesses all major armaments. The NKVD also operates many schools, composes the entire government in eastern regions, controls military and engineering projects.
It has been described as ". . . the incomparable, majestic, unique monolith resting upon
" DALLIN, THE REAL SOVIET RUSSIA
inhumanity, slavery, abomination, and death...

244 (1944).
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to that of the Nazis, and the OVRA to that of Italian Fascism. The
functions and inclusiveness of the police in a dictatorship should convey
some notion of what is meant by a "police state."
What must be emphasized is that inclusiveness, systematic scientific
torture, anticipatory detention, and purges are not irrational brutalities
of political police in a dictatorship. There is a reason for all of them.
For example, liquidation of the family of a suspect is not only a weapon
of deterrence, but a means of securing confessions, and a dramatic episode
in unremitting propaganda. It also underscores the principal task of
such police--to perpetrate the control of the dictator. Thus, it is evident
that all the far-flung, nefarious activities of the political police in dictatorial states are approved, indeed, they are commanded by the heads of
the state.s

The important difference between the two types of police can be
indicated by noting the treatment of political crimes in dictatorships and
in democracies. In a dictatorship a political criminal is the worst of all
possible offenders, even if he merely whispers a timid criticism. He is
the mortal enemy of the dictator, entitled to no legal right whatever, a
veritable outlaw. For him, there is only secret trial, exile, or annihilation. On the other hand, in a democracy there is no legal difference
whatever between a political crime and any other crime. The same procedures, rights, privileges, appeals, and treatment after conviction prevail.
The rules against entrapment, involuntary confession, and the presumption of innocence apply as fully in trials of political offenders as in any
other criminal trials. Nor must one fancy that non-political criminals
have legal rights in dictatorial states, i.e., claims that are bound to be
respected. The Gestapo could step in anytime and take over, making
any case "political" for any reason it saw fit. One of their officials
announced in 1937: "Untouchable rights of the person or 'private
spheres' cannot be acknowledged whenever they hinder the functioning
of the Nation."' 19
In 1933 the Prussian Administrative Court decided that the Secret
Police was not subject to judicial control. 20 The same court announced:
"There are no longer any aspects of life which are non-political." Thus
a woman sympathetic to the Jehovah Witnesses was denied a peddler's
license because her mode of thought was ".

.

. incompatible with the

18. Hermann Goering said: "I declared then, before thousands of my fellowcountrymen, that every bullet fired from the barrel of a police pistol was my bullet. If
one calls that murder, then I am a murderer." BRAMSTEIYF, Op. cit. supra note 14, at x.
19. Id. at 102.
20. FRAENKEL, op. cit. supra note 16, at 26.

POLICE AND LAW IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

143

heroic attitude characteristic of our nation today."'' 1 Art, music, the
schools and press, churches and organizations-all were police-controlled.
Large segments of the population came within their jurisdiction solely
because of their race or religion. The NKVD has even greater powers,
and there can never be any assurance that ordinary process will not be
set aside and ignored. Secret police are not bound by judicial -decision,
and 'persons acquitted in the ordinary courts are seized and treated as
the police see fit.
While our police are not political in the same ways as the ruthless
agents of a police state, it would be erroneous to conclude that they are
not political in any sense or in defensible ways. Attention has been
directed to the participation of all citizens in police work in England,
to various phases of such participation at the present time, and to the
many private protective associations. All of these activities have a
political significance, namely, that policing in our culture is a public,
_RoliticaLfunction. In a democratic society, the corollary is the dependence of professional police upon the public with regard to detection,
evidence, financial support, and in last analysis, the police job itself.
Partly in fact and wholly in ideal, the political significance of the police
function in a democratic society is epitomized as self-policing, which
specialization and the remuneration of a trained force do not alter. Set
the self-policing of a democratic community against the intimidation and
absolute domination of the entire population by police answerable only
to a dictator, and you reach the essential difference between the two
systems.
The responsibility of the police of dictatorial states to no one and
to nothing except the will of their leader, their unlimited power to arrest,
try in secret without any semblance of standardized procedure, their
decisions and their enforcement of penalties without recourse to any
court-all of these are characteristics of domination by sheer physical
force unlimited by law. It is the antithesis of the rule of law, the
Rechtsstaat. In sharp contrast, the democratic state represents the rule
of law. This poses one of the great issues of Western history, extending
from ancient Greece to our own times. What does it mean in terms of
the police problem?
The sovereignty of law is opposed to the unfettered power
officials. In democracies, it is insisted that law is preferable to
unlimited discretion of even benevolent rulers, because the essence of
democratic creed is self-rule. But, in fact, history has rarely posed
21. Id. at 53.

of
the
the
the
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issue in the context of the kind, wise ruler. Rather the question has
been one assuring regularity, certainty, prediction, and equality of treatment in the face of the ruthless domination of power-hungry despots.
The blood of countless freedom-loving men has been spilled to win the
hard victory institutionalized in the rule of law, especially in that area
22
of conduct where the severe penalties of criminal law are imposed.
A vast literature discusses rule of law in many of its phases and
applications. But rule of law on the most important level of all-that
of police-has elicited only catch-words such as "lawless police" or
"lawless enforcement of the law." The police aspect of rule of law must
be carefully examined.
Rules of law are certain standards and commands, expressed in
thousands of statutes, decisions, regulations, and in constitutions. It is
important to note the interconnectedness of the entire body of legal rules.
They are arrangeable in a harmonious order extending from the very
general propositions of constitutional law through the middle range of
statutes and decisions, down to the very specific concrete applications of
them by police officers. The rule concretely exhibited in the arrest of
John Doe by a police officer is: If I reasonably think X's home was
entered by someone intending to commit a crime there, and I reasonably
think John Doe did 'that, it is my legal duty to arrest him. That is the
specific meaning of the rule which in statutes and case law is stated in
the following general terms: If a police officer reasonably thinks a
felony has been committed, it is his legal duty to arrest anyone whom he
reasonably believes committed the felony. And a relevant constitutional
provision might be the very broad generalization, "due process." In
sum, the policeman who conforms to law is the living embodiment of
the law, he is its microcosm on the level of its most specific incidence.
He is literally law in action, for in action law must be specific. He is
the concrete distillation of the entire mighty, historic corpus juris, representing all of it, including the constitution itself. Thus, the law-enforcing
activity of the policeman takes on its great significance not only because
it is law in the concrete form in which it is experienced by individual
persons, but also because the meaning and value of the entire legal order
are expressed in the policeman's specific acts or omissions-so long as
he conforms to law.
When that law is the law of a democratic society, 23 the conduct of
the policeman becomes the living expression of democratic law with all
22.
23.

HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAv c. 2
HALL, LIVING LAW OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1949).

(1947).
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its values, meanings, and potentialities. Whatever disputes there may
be regarding law in general or the law of past eras, it is clear that
democratic law has at least two important characteristics. Democratic
law is ethical law. Democratic law also represents self-rule. That the
law of democratic societies embodies the best values is especially manifested in legally enforced constitutions which give effect to freedom of
speech, press, and religion, protection from abusive official conduct, fair
trial, and other civil liberties. From another perspective, we find in
democratic law standards of fairness, reasonableness, and human decency.
Democratic law expresses and encourages equality and human dignity.
It allows free play for value experience and consequent progress. It
disciplines officials who otherwise lack definite standards to apply regularly and consistently.
Democratic law can be viewed not only in this substantive way; it
can also be appraised in terms of a method of governing, especially of
arriving at important decisions. This includes certain methods of criminal procedure, e.g., the presumption of innocence, notice and opportunity
to prepare, specificity of the indictment, right to counsel, unbiased judge,
and change of venue. Finally, democratic law can be viewed as the
ethical, rational control of power, as the actualization of basic values in
political institutions.
This may help one to appreciate the fuller significance of the policeman's functions in a democratic society. On the concrete level of
individual experience with the most severe sanctions, he is the living
embodiment of democratic law. If he conforms to that law, he becomes
the most important official in the entire hierarchy, able to facilitate the
progressively greater realization of democratic values.
How serious an obstacle, therefore, is the thoughtless attitude of
the American public toward the police! The supercilious condescension
of respected classes toward policemen reaps its inevitable crop-low
self-esteem, little insight into basic functions, and no appreciation of
potential contributions to enrichment of the democratic way of life by
superior police service, especially in relation to the weaker members of
the community.
Intelligent Americans therefore have a major job to do-first, to
understand the meanings of police service in a democratic society; then,
by their support and cooperation, they must create a police force that is
capable of discharging its duties in a manner that strengthens the democratic way of life. The most important step in this reorientation of a
public institution is a change in attitude toward police functions.
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We must come to regard the police not as our substitutes for police
service, releasing us from any obligation, but as our trained specialized
helpers in a type of law enforcement that is compatible with democratic
values. The test case for us is the quality of police service in relation
to minorities, for here we meet the full challenge to democratic values
in its most insistent, dramatic appeal. In sum, the challenge to enlightened police and laymen extends far beyond an appreciation of elementary
functions, necessary to biological survival. It transcends the necessity
of controlling anti-social conduct. It includes the positive conception
of maintaining order in ways that preserve and extend the precious
values of a democratic society. For while democratic societies, like all
other societies, need order, they need a distinctive kind of order, one that
is not imposed by an uncontrolled force, but one that is achieved by
police methods that reflect democratic values.

II
PREVENTIVE MEASURES AND ARREST

The literature on police, including surveys and studies by various
commissions, abounds in adverse criticism. 24 It is based on an implied
"bad man" theory, and assumes that by exhortation and scolding, police
services can be improved. The difficulty with that approach is not so
much that it is unfair to the police, but that it does not investigate the
basic causes of police abuse and ineffectiveness. Nor does it articulate
a definite policy to guide reform of the police establishment.
Part I, besides dealing with police functions as a fundamental phase
social
process, was intended to provide a definite policy to guide the
of
police of a democratic society and to permit evaluation of their work.
That policy, in sum, is to maintain order in ways that preserve and
advance democratic values. This policy can be expressed in a number
of specific standards formulated as relevant questions:
1. Do the police conform to the laws requiring them to protect all
persons, including members of minority groups, from aggression?
2. Do the police enforce the law equally against all offenders, regardless of race or economic status?
3. Do the police use legal controls which require and encourage
self-policing by the community?
24.

See note 15 supra.
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4. Are the police held legally responsible for their illegal conduct
in the same ways that lay persons must answer for their illegal conduct?
5. Do the police take preventive measures to diminish criminal
aggression against minorities and to check the early symptoms of riot?
6. Do the police always function as officers or do they often assume
judicial and executive powers?
In order to evaluate the operation of the police establishment, we
need to determine what legal controls are available to carry the standards
into effect. Suppose we take the standpoint of a thoughtful police
official, e.g., a Captain of police who appreciates democratic values and
is anxious to preserve and advance them. If he were placed in a potential
riot neighborhood, he would realize that mob action, combining, as it
does, unreasoning hate and destruction, inflicts the worst possible damage
upon democratic values and methods whose essense is rational discussion
and friendly interpersonal relations.
The first insight into which legal controls to apply in such serious
situations is the perception that there are different kinds of mob disorder.
The simpler type is that crystallized in a particular place-e.g., a mob
bent on lynching a particular person, or where a particular building is
the focal point. This, in fact, is the typical mob of the older common
law. The justice of the peace was required to read th Riot Ac and
demand the dispersal of the mob. Those who failed to leave the mob
became felons. The statutes of some states impose this duty on specific
officials, including, e.g., ".... any member of a city police force and any
member of the state police . . . in the name of the people . . .to
command all the persons so assembled immediately and peaceably to
disperse.... ,,25 And the neglect of officers to suppress a riot is a
crime in many states. 26 It is also significant that statutes in many states
preserve the common law tradition of empowering peace officers to
summon citizens to assist them in law enforcement, and make it a
criminal offense to refuse to comply.2 7 These laws suggest that prompt
action by a single policeman, familiar with his legal powers and duties,
might often nip rioting in the bud. He need not read a riot act but he
can utilize the psychology of deliberate announcement of the illegality of
the mob, thus stimulating thought as well as providing a deterrent.
25. MicH. Comnw. LA.ws § 750.521 (1948). Also see ALA. CODE tit. 35, § 163
CAL PEN. CoDE § 726 (1949); ILL. ANN. STAT.c. 37, § 446 (1935); MASS. GEN.
269, § 1 (1932) ; N. Y. C ImiNAL CODE § 106.
26. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 410 (1949); MASs. GEN. LAWs c. 269, § 3
N. Y. CRImINAL CODE § 109.
27. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 723 (1949) IL,, ANN. STAT. C. 37, § 468
N. Y. CRIMINAL CODE § 107,

(1940);
LAws

C.

(1932);
(1935)
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As stated in Part I, the posse comitatus is historic in our culture,
and it is still regularly employed in rural areas in this country. 2 A
critical situation provides an excellent opportunity to actualize the ideal
of self-policing which is the essence of the police function in a democracy.
If this is thought to be impractical in a large city, it should be remembered that in the New York Harlem riots several hundred citizens were
deputized as peace officers. Over 200,000 citizens were enrolled as
Special Constables 29 in the threatened great Chartist riots in England in
1848. In the Detroit riot, there was conspicuous voluntary service by
groups of socially-minded white and Negro citizens. 30 Formal authorization and official deliberate use of the relevant legal instruments could
have made such voluntary service more effective by enlisting and organizing the services of many other citizens.
The more serious kind of mob disorder is the Detroit typedecentralized rioting over a wide area by small groups who often use
the automobile for quick attacks and escape. This is primitive warfare
on a large scale and it threatens the elementary bonds of social order.
Consequently, it calls for the maximum discipline and the best possible
law enforcement. 31 An officer who stands by while a vicious attack is
being made is violating the criminal law and should be prosecuted as a
criminal. An officer who arrests rioters of one group and closes his
eyes to the aggressions of the other, is violating the equality of democratic law and encourages passionate recrimination and the breakdown
of democratic institutions. There are many legal sanctions applicable to
that sort of misconduct and nonfeasance.
The gravity of mob disorder is shown in the prohibition under
criminal penalty of two less serious situations that tend to culminate in
riot, namely, unlawful assembly and rout. Three or more persons
gathered for an unlawful purpose constituted at common law an unlawful
assembly. 32 If and when they began to move toward the consummation
of their criminal purpose they constituted a rout ;33 and if they proceeded
to the point of putting their criminal intention into effect, they were
28. Larence, The Constituitioaity of the Posse Comitatus Act, 8 KAx. CITy L.
REv. 164, 166 (1940).
29. LEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 314.
30. LEE AND HUMPHREY, RACE RIOT (1943).
31. For extensive bibliographies see, LOHMAN, THE POLICE AND MINORITY GROUPS
(1947) ; U. N. Publication, The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination (1949).
32. Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 130, 65 N. E. 84 (1902); Louisville v. Lougher,
209 Ky. 299, 272 S. W. 748 (1925) ; New Jersey v. Butterworth, 104 N. J. L. 579, 142

AtI. 57 (1928).
33. Follis v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 535, 40 S. W. 277 (1897) ; People v.
Judson, 11 Daly 1 (N. Y. 1849) ; State v. Summer, 29 S. C. L. (2 Speers 1844).
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committing a riot.34 The statutes of many states preserve these distinctions with minor changes, e.g., as to the number of persons participating.
The distinctions drawn among unlawful assembly, rout, and riot
bear a close analogy to preparation and criminal attempt, and it is significant that while preparation to commit a crime is not a crime, that is not
true so far as unlawful assembly and rout are concerned. Here, the
"volcanic forces" and widespread harm flowing from riots result in
prohibition of the most incipient stages of that crime.
But the use of excessive force is illegal, regardless of the gravity
of the situation. Our hypothetical Captain would realize that while a
riot is the maximum challenge to the efficiency of his force, it is also
the greatest opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of democratic
police methods. Without suggesting that the English police have attained
perfection, it is notable that in the great Reform riots in 1868, although
265 policemen out of 1613 were wounded, "and one Superintendent, two
inspectors, nine sergeants, and 33 constables were so severely injured
as to be incapacitated for life," the Quarterly Review reported: "The
police behaved with the most admirable moderation and not a single
case of unnecessary violence was proved against them." 35
When a riot occurs, the house is already on fire, and the principal
objective is to extinguish the flames by sound methods. One need not
be a social scientist to appreciate the fact that riots are the end-results
of chronic maladjustment. We cann6t here deal with the basic socioeconomic and psychological factors that are involved;36 we must attend
to those external manifestations of the underlying causes which are relevant to the use of legal controls by the police. The important factors
are those indications of maladjustment and friction which occur every
day. Among these, specific symptoms of future serious troubles are
insults, threats, batteries and malicious destruction of property. Intelligent law-enforcement in such seemingly petty cases is of the utmost
importance in the creation of wholesome law-abiding attitudes. Of
necessity the police must be selective in making arrests since it is physically impossible to arrest all offenders, spend the requisite time in court,
and still attend to the regular duties of active law-enforcement. The
34. Ibid.
35. LEE, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 327.
36. The factors emphasized by sociologists as causes or conditions leading to
riots, e.g., competition for jobs, housing problems, and ignorance of each other's cultural achievements, do not, of themselves, culminate in riots. It seems more probable
that the daily accumulation of aggressions, aggravated by the social conditions noted
above, sets off the acute outbursts.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
situation therefore demands realistic decisions guided by democratic
goals and knowledge of the facts.
The police are familiar with arrest for assault and battery and for
disorderly conduct, but they have ignored other available controls and
legal measures which can be taken before crimes are committed or before
serious aggressions occur. First among these is the peace bond, used
in family disputes and in rural areas, but ignored as a control of incipient symptoms of serious disorder. Perhaps the most typical case in the
appellate court reports is that of an individual who has threatened
another with injury to his person or property. On the affidavit of four
persons who feared that a certain individual would do them bodily harm,
the judge, in a Louisiana case, 37 ordered the relator to furnish a peace
bond. The court acted under authority of a Louisiana constitutional
provision to the effect that district judges have jurisdiction to require
bonds to keep the peace, and under authority of a statute providing that
on refusal to give bond, the judge shall commit the party to the custody
of the sheriff, who shall imprison him until he gives the bond.
In a Texas case, the relator, who threatened to kill a certain man,
was held in custody and directed to give a $3,000 bond to keep the peace
for one year. The Court of Criminal Appeals in affirming the action,
rejected the relator's argument that since he could have carried out the
threat and did not, the bond was improper. The court said: "The very
purpose of [the statute] . . . was to halt such threats prior to an effort

at their execution, and we think these articles were properly and timely
invoked by the state."'3 8 Several defendants were indicted in Kentucky
for unlawfully confederating together for the purpose of intimidating,
alarming, and disturbing certain persons. In the trial of one of the
defendants a verdict of not guilty was returned. Thereupon the court,
characterizing the defendants as "dangerous, violent men," said: " . . .
[I]t appearing to the court that the safety of life and the security of
property requires the . . . [defendants] . . . to file bonds to keep the

peace in the sum of $5,000, to be of good behaviour towards all persons
for the period of one year; and it is further ordered that if they or
either of them fail to file said bond that they each be confined in the
county jail for a period of three months." 39 The defendants' appeal was
dismissed.
37. In re Bordelon, 210 La. 1080,29 So.2d 162 (1946).
38. Ex parte Luehrs, 152 Tex. Cr. 348, 350, 214 S.W.2d 126, 127 (1948).
39. -Waggoner v. Commonwealth, 254 Ky. 200, 201, 71 S.W.2d 421, 422 (1934). Also
see People ex rel. Smith v. Blaylock, 357 Ill. 23, 26, 191 N.E. 206, 208 (1934), where
the relator threatened to blow up the powder magazine of a certain company. He was
arrested and ordered by a justice to give a recognizance to keep the peace for 12
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In many of the cases involving peace bonds favorable references
were made to preventive justice. The statutes are broad enough to
include the issuance of orders for recognizance against almost any
threatened breach of the peace. The constitutionality of these statutes
is upheld on the grounds that the procedure is not of a criminal but
of a quasi-criminal nature 40 and that, as conservators of the peace, the
courts can require bonds "to keep the peace" and "to be of good behavior." The use of the peace bond as a technique to check incipient
criminal behavior, especially in areas of tension and friction, should receive careful consideration.
There are other noteworthy legal controls which were designed to
check criminal conduct in its incipient stages. At common law a threat,
privately made, was not criminal unless it amounted to extortion. But
under many statutes a threat uttered publicly in conditions tending
toward a breach of the peace is "disorderly conduct," as is insulting,
profane language in public. 41 More serious is the common law crime of
solicitation or incitement to commit a crime, and incitement to riot is
one form of that offense. Conspiracy extends incipient criminal behavior
to the conduct of two or more persons; and there are reported cases
where convictions of conspiracy to commit a breach of the peace were
upheld. 42 As to the relevancy of this device to potential rioting, it may
be noted, that with reference to the threatened Washington, D. C., disorders in 1950, the Washington Post reported: "Trouble is likely to
arise only if, as was the case in 1949, some organized group attempts
''43
to foment it.
Police assigned to an area where tension and friction

are prevalent should be familiar with these legal controls which, if
soundly employed, can prevent serious trouble and foster law-abiding
conduct.
months. The order was affirmed on the ground that "[i]t is the intention of the statute

to provide a method by which threatened breaches of the peace against persons or
property may be prevented. The statute does not make the uttering of a threat or the
intent of a person to commit an offense against the person or property of another a
criminal offense within the legal meaning of the term 'criminal offense.' A person
arrested under the act is not to be fined or committed to jail for the making of such
threat or because he may have intended to commit an offense against the person or
property of another. If he is held to have made such threat or to have intended to
commit such offense, he is merely required, under the statute, to give such reasonable
security as will act as a deterrent against the consummation of such supposed threat
or intent to violate the law in the respect legislated against."
40. Ex parte Wag, 56 Cal. App. 2d 814, 133 P.2d 637 (1943) ; State ex tel. Yost v.
Scousyzio, 126 W. Va. 135, 27 S.E.2d 451 (1943).
41. CAL. PEN. CODE § 415 (1949) ; N.Y. Pmn. LAW § 722.
42. See 2 WHARToN, CRImINM. LAW § 1620 (12th ed. 1932).
43. Quoted in Comment, Racial Violence and Civil Rights Law Enforcement, 18 U.
OF

Cm. L. REv. 769, 775 (1951).
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While knowledge of the various preventive legal controls is essential, a more difficult problem concerns the failure to use them. This
problem is by no means confined to the omission to use laws which are
both pertinent and traditional. Indeed, it is in the overt conduct of
the police that abuses occur which raise the most serious problems in
a society founded on the sovereignty of law.
Turning from the standards of democratic police service and the
implied legal duties to the actual operation of the police force in our
society, we find huge gaps in some areas-which means violation of the
standards and the laws. Despite the cliche, "police lawlessness," this
is not peculiar to the police, for the gaps between the ideals of democratic
law and actual conformity run through our entire society, including the
decisions of judges. The gaps between police practices and their legal
duties raise especially serious problems because, unlike the decisions
of the courts, the policeman is the concrete living law as it meets John
Q. Citizen every day. The consequent problems have diverse causes;
hence, there is no single sweeping solution.
It has been a traditional boast regarding Anglo-American law that
officials stand on the same plane as lay persons regarding submission
to the rule of law, that officials can be held accountable in the courts
for theii torts and crimes. Unfortunately, when we turn from the law
to the actual practices we discover disturbing facts.
Perhaps the most typical police task is the arrest and imprisonment
of persons suspected of criminal behavior. There are many rules of
law limiting the power of arrest and imposing duties on police officers
with regard to their conduct after arrests are made. Other rules provide
legal remedies for illegal arrest and imprisonment. The fact is, however,
that there are several million illegal arrests and imprisonments in the
United States each year, and that only a handful of damage suits are
filed against policemen.
The frequency of illegal arrests also arouses suspicion regarding
the relatively high rate of arrests of Negroes. The Uniform Crime
Reports from 1935 to 1940 included statistics on the race of arrestees,
showing that 6 Y2_times as many Negroes are arrested per 100,000 as
are foreign-born whites, and that proportionately 3 times as many
Negroes are arrested as are native-born whites. 4 4 It is possible that those
statistics reflect the actual criminal behavior of the three groups represented. But in light of what we know about wholesale illegal arrests,
it is not unlikely that some of the statistics are accounted for by the
44.

UNIF. CR. REP.
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fact that the Negro is also allocated to the impotent, underprivileged
classes whose legal rights may be infringed upon with impunity.
Even if we accept the thesis that the crime rate among Negroes is
disproportionately high, we cannot discount the frustration and insecurity of Negroes as potent causes. Discriminatory law enforcement,
including the failure to protect Negroes from the aggression of other
Negroes, aggravates tendencies toward criminal behavior. Equal enforcement of law by the police would have a curative, morale-building
effect which would be of the greatest value in critical situations. These
facts underline the general point that day-to-day law enforcement is
the basic, if not sole, determinant of the quality of law enforcement
available in dealing with race conflicts and riots.
Most victims of illegal arrest and imprisonment are vagrants,
drunkards, and other maladjusted or economically underprivileged persons. The vast majority of these victims of illegal police practices consult no lawyers or organizations with a view to redressing the legal
wrongs done them. They seem to accept the treatment as normal procedure. But among the millions of illegal arrests that occur in this
country every year, many of the victims have sufficient self-respect to
resent the wrong done them, and enough resources to do something
about it. Yet very few of them sue the police for damages, and for
good reason-the ill-paid policeman, if he is not judgment-proof, only
rarely has sufficient property, reachable by legal process, to encourage
action against him personally.
Garnishment is often a useful remedy, but in the vast majority
of the states it is impossible to garnishee the salarids of public officials. 45
The policeman is an employee of a corporation, and it is well established
that a principal must answer for the torts committed by his servant
in the course of employment. Here, however, another special rule meets
the injured person-public corporations are not liable for torts committed
in the discharge of governmental, as distinguished from proprietary,
functions.

46

A final promising possibility would seem to be suit on the officer's
bond. But city police are often not covered and where they are a whole
array of technicalities arises to the dismay of the injured claimant who,
as a solitary litigant, faces a great surety corporation and its battery
of lawyers. The surety's most frequent escape from liability on the
bond results from the curious holding that when the police officer
45. 6 MCQUILLIN,

THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §

46. See Borchard, Gow'rnmental Liability in Tort, 34

2681 (2d ed. 1928).
(1925).

YALE L.J. 229
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injures someone in violation of the law, he is not acting virtute officii,
which is a clever way of saying that although the police were arresting
for suspected crimes or were beating a suspect to secure a confession,
they were not acting within the scope of their employment. It was,
said one court, a "usurpation of power."' 47 Thus, where the need for
protection is greatest, the illegal conduct is only colore officii. The upshot
is that where there is legal liability, as in the case of the policeman, the
fact of financial irresponsibility is usually a conclusive obstacle to recovery. And where there is financial responsibility, as in the case of the
48
city, there is no legal liability.
More serious than the millions of illegal arrests that occur annually
are illegal imprisonments and releases without judicial determination.
Again, the rules are clear-detention may be only for the short reasonable time required to produce the arrestee in court; and discharging him
is a judicial act. No less clear are the facts of flagrant violation-long
imprisonment, no court appearance, and release by the police without
court order. This amounts to usurpation of the judicial function and
the administration of punishment-the gross violation of basic standards
of police service in a democratic society.
In a study made some years ago, it was estimated that there were
3Y2 million illegal arrests and imprisonments in the United States in
1933.40 In 1948, 50 1949, 51 and 195052 there were apparently even more
illegal arrests and imprisonments in this country. In addition to drunkenness and vagrancy, many of these illegal arrests and imprisonments
were made upon suspicion in order to facilitate investigation, or they
were made at the request of another state, or they were the result of
inadequate facilities to provide a prompt judicial hearing. Many others
resulted from the strictness of the common law rule that any restraint
on movement, including brief detention for the purpose of questioning,
is an imprisonment.
Accordingly, although there is an abundance of law on arrest, imprisonment, and release, inquiry into practice reveals that the rules, as
regard to certain classes, are little more than mere pretensions. This is
a very serious matter in a democratic society, for it discloses a cell
of official lawlessness which can expand in any direction, and the breed47. Brooks v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 147 Md. 1944, 127 Atl. 758 (1925).
48. See Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems,
3 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 345 (1936).
49. 4, No. 4, UNiF. CR. REP. 23 (1934).

50. 20, No. 1, UNiF. CR.REP. 61-63 (1949).
51. 21, No. 1, UNIF. CR.REP. 61-63 (1950).
52. 22, No. 1, UiF,CR. RE. 57-59 (1951).
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ing ground of a power which can be more readily used against citizens
other than the present victims. Certainly we do not want our police
to be a Praetorian Guard available to some would-be Caesar.
One of the standards of the police in a democratic society is the
sharp demarcation of the police job from judicial functions, and the
restriction of police to the so-called ministerial work. Some scholars,
however, have stated that police functions necessarily include judicial
functions because the police must decide whether a crime has been
commited, whether it is a felony or a misdemeanor, what is an arrest,
etc. But this interpretation confuses the fact that all persons make legal
decisions with the essential nature of judicial decisions. This is an
important question and the practical phase of it can be indicated by
comparing the English police with the Gestapo or NKVD. It is the
dictatorial police who sit as judges, decide cases, and enforce their
decisions. The English police take their prisoners before judges who
try and decide the cases. Surely there must be important differences in
the respective functions. What are they?
In the first place, so long as the police in a democratic society
obey the law, they do not decide that an arrestee is guilty of any crime
That is not a policeman's job any more than it is the job of the lawyers
who prosecute and defend the case. To be guilty of a crime means
to have been found guilty beyond any reasonable doubt by a court
of law. Indeed, the police are not permitted under law to refrain from
arresting until they are convinced to that extent, or they would rarely
act. They are bound to arrest when they have only reasonable grounds
to believe that the arrestee committed a crime. The question of guilt
is a judicial one.
Secondly, thepojjiedo not define or declare any general rules of
law, as do judges. And finally, whatever the police in our system may
think the rules of law mean, their interpretations are not authoritative.
They are not, like judicial decisionsWhen
one
perceives that litigation between parties is not essential to the exercise
of the judicial function, and since decisions are handed down in noncontested cases, it becomes clear that the essence of judging is the
authoritativeness and general significance of the decisions rendered. 53
If these distinctions between the functions of the judge and that
of the policeman are borne in mind, it is easy to recognize the implications. To have police arrest on reasonable grounds and then to provide
a prompt, fair trial with all the legal and constitutional safeguards of
53. See GAvIT, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY oF LAw, § 62 (1951).
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democratic law is one thing. To allow the police to act not only as
officers but also as prosecutors, judges, jury, and administrators of penal
institutions, substituting crude, sometimes barbaric methods for the
rational, fair procedures and treatment symbolized as "due process,"
is the complete antithesis of democratic law.
Thus, regardless of pragmatic justifications, we face a very serious
problem in the fact of wholesale illegal imprisonment of millions of
arrested persons each year by police who are legally bound to take these
persons promptly to a court which has jurisdiction to decide whether
to release them or not. And, obviously, the corporal punishment of
arrestees, because they have aroused the ire of policemen who wish to
make sure that they will not escape unscathed, is the worst kind of
usurpation of power.
From the viewpoint of efficiency, police lawlessness is the worst
possible practice. It builds the wall between police and public higher
than ever. It stops channels of information and blocks the sources of
evidence.5 4 Realization that the police are a mere handful, impotent
to control' by sheer physical force, as is demonstrated when rioting
breaks out in a large city, makes it evident that the usurpation by the
police of judicial or executive functions comes at a very high price in
a democratic community. If the police are educated to understand the
rules of law which define their particular job, and if they function impartially within the limits of those laws, they will preserve democratic
procedures and win the public support that is essential to police efficiency.
In considering the above problems from the policeman's point of
view, it is clear that under present conditions he would feel aggrieved
if he were compelled to pay from his personal estate for acts done in
the conscientious discharge of his duties. In almost every police department this would be the normal attitude so far as illegal arrest and
imprisonment are concerned. And in many departments that attitude
would also prevail with regard to coerced confessions, especially in
cases that outrage the community's feelings.
Moreover, when we consider that the vast majority of persons
subjected to illegal imprisonment are vagrants, drunkards, and derelicts,
we realize that the police conduct serves as a crude prophylaxis and as
a minor benefit to the arrestees, in providing a night's lodging and time
to become sober. In the absence of substantial social reform providing
adeqtate treatment of these classes, the present police practice, crude as
it is, can hardly be abandoned. Possible action for the legal harms can
54. Best, Why the Police Fail, 166 Harpers 205-206 (1932).
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be avoided by requiring waivers to be signed on release from prison;
this is done in Massachusetts in drunkenness cases. 55 That procedure
is, however, a merely expedient measure and may be abused. A much
better measure would be provision for immediate hearing by a police
judge who would refer the more promising cases to social agencies
and institutions which could give more adequate treatment. The point
to be underlined is that police lawlessness in this area may not be vicious
or brutal; on the contrary, it may be well motivated and it serves a
social need.
It is more difficult to provide effective remedies for illegal arrest
and imprisonment in cases which do not fall within the classes requiring
corrective treatment. Federal statutes and a few states permit recovery
against the government for imprisonment of persons subsequently proved
innocent. 5 Those laws are infrequently used, and the job of rendering
tort law effective in suits for damages for harms caused by policemen
is much more difficult. Nevertheless, if it is agreed that the present
situation cannot be permitted to continue, practical solutions must be
sought, as in Danish law which provides for financial recovery against
the state in certain cases.
If the huge number of illegal arrests and imprisonments were
drastically reduced by the provision of agencies to look-after the drunkards and derelicts or, pending such basic reform, by the use of waivers
on release, the problem would begin to assume manageable proportions.
Departmental discipline could move into a position to exercise actual
control of personnel, and many wrongly arrested and imprisoned persons
would be satisfied with the departmental sanctions. A major question
would concern the nature of the policeman's violati6n-whether he
was merely negligent or was vicious and brutal. In the former, the
policeman might not be held personally liable. In both situations, public
liability, either directly or by elimination of the technicalities of the
law of suretyship, should provide effective remedies for injuries and
damage caused by police.
Major reforms in the law of arrest, in addition to the indicated
social substitute for the present crude prophylaxis in cases of underprivileged classes and the use of waivers, are necessary to render financial
responsibility feasible. Our law of arrest arose in the simple conditions
55. MASS. ANN. LAws C. 272, § 45 (Cum. Supp. 1951). See Doherty v. Shea, 320
Mass. 173, 68 N.E.2d 707 (1946); Horgan v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 208 Mass. 287,
94 N.E. 386 (1911).

56. 52

STAT.

438 (1938), 1& U.S.C 720 (1946); CAL. PEN.

CODE

(1949); N.D. REv. CODE § 1205r(1943); Wis. STAT. § 285.05 (1943).
U. oF Cal.L. REv. 773 (1948) ; 57 YALE L.J. 1135 (1948).
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See Notes, 15
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of rural England. It was definitely formulated when prisons were
wretched dungeons swept by typhus; in 1759, e.g., one-fourth of the
inmates died in English prisons. Bail was rarely granted; jailers charged
fees for every minor privilege and they received a fixed sum for expenses
regardless of the food and facilities they supplied.5 7 In those conditions
arrest was a calamity. Hence the right to arrest was rigorously restricted
and citizens were privileged to resist illegal arrests even to T point
of killing the officers. That is substantially the law which we inihrited
aad still have on our books today. But under present conditions, since
only a minor inconvenience will be sustained by submission to brief
detention, it is indefensible to insist on the right to resist every illegal
arrest and thus sanction even the severe injury or killing of officers if
the situation can be subsumed under the privilege of self-defense. Legal
reform here, enlarging the right of arrest, is not only socially necessary;
it would also eliminate vast numbers of presently illegal arrests and
detentions.58
The law of most states considers any detention, even for the purpose
of "frisking," an arrest. But the 4-inch pistol is a new weapon, and
it is impossible to determine, prior to frisking, whether one is being
carried. Such a search is legally privileged only after a legal arrest.
but that is inadequate to police safety and the public needs. Under
present law, the only way for an officer to try to remain within the
bounds of legality is to make the arrest, search, imprison, and take the
arrestee to court-regardless of the fact that the search discovered only
a newspaper or a book. It would seem outrageous to the citizen to be
imprisoned under those circumstances; the common sense of the police
avoids this substantial inconvenience. Similar problems are involved
when police arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors not amounting
to breaches of the peace committed in their presence, for in many states
the common law limitation persists, making such arrests illegal. There are
also technical distinctions concerning felony and misdemeanor which
render many arrests illegal.
What merits wide recognition with reference to these numerous
illegal arrests and imprisonments is that the police in many cases are
unable to perform their protective duties without violating their legal
duties under the present rules. They come upon persons at night in
circumstances which do not amount to reasonable grounds to suspect
concealment of a gun, yet instinct and protective duty require frisking
and, of course, the detention necessary for that. Or, a number of sus57. Warner, Investigating the Law of Arrest, 31

113 (1940).
58. Id. at 111.
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pects are picked up in a rapid move to apprehend an offender, when
the only description of a robber is that he is about 21 years old and
wore a blue sweater. In an actual case, several persons who were arrested
were released at the station after two hours' detention. 59 Under the law
of many states such arrests are probably illegal and the detention was
certainly illegal, since the suspects were not brought before a magistrate
and released by him. Yet few would deny that the police conduct in
this case was both justifiable and decent. The legalizing of questioning
and of the necessary short detention, qualified by permission to communicate with counsel and warning regarding self-incrimination, as well
as the sanctioning of search for weapons before arrest and release by
the police in certain situations would bring the lagging law of arrest
into focus with present social needs. Other reforms included in the
Uniform Arrest Act0 0 would also help free police from the present conflict of protective and legal duties.
Finally, it is time that we made full use of the summons in dealing
with persons who have a permanent residence. We lag far behind England, Canada, and many other countries in this regard, still arresting
hundreds of thousands of citizens in cases where the summons would
be wholly adequate to secure their appearance in court. The public
resentment against police who make the arrests may be unfounded; but
it exists and it can be eliminated by a simple law expanding the scope
of the summons and educating the police regarding its use.
The present wholesale violation of the rules by police, condoned
by their superior officers, encourages undisciplined behavior and nullification of democratic laws. It therefore has an inevitable impact on
the handling of acute situations fomented by tension and aggressiveness.
The policeman who regularly plays fast and loose with important rules
of law lacks the discipline required for impartial, competent law-enforcement in critical situations. Persons living in tension areas, who
are illegally arrested and imprisoned, are suspiciou8 of the police, and
that influences their conduct not only in the rare instance of riot, but
in their daily activities. The archaic law of arrest encourages policemen
to use wide powers, not provided for by law-so that instead of being
police officers they must make decisions and discharge functions that
are legislative, judicial, and administrative. The evils of such power
in the hands of the police are aggravated in times of rioting.
The situation regarding the illegal arrest and imprisonment of
millions of persons annually in this country, serious as it is, must be
59. Id. at 120.
60. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. R1v. 315 (1942).
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placed in the general context of the entire functioning of the police
before valid conclusions can be drawn. It is probable that in many
situations, e.g., in dealing with known, responsible persons and with
professional criminals, .the police by and large conform to law. While
the standards and rules of democratic law are effective in those areas,
there is bound to be a carry-over from habits developed in dealing with
the maladjusted classes.
Nor, for the reasons stated in Part I, could one validly assert that
the behavior of police toward drunkards, vagrants, and the members
of certain minority groups is identical to or equivalent with that of the
police of dictatorial states. There remain important differences in the
degree and frequency of brutality, its systematic, scientific use, in the
purpose of the restraint, and in other regards.
But while such comparisons may help one to rebut superficial
criticism of police, it is more important to recognize the harmfulness
and dlangers of police lawlessness in a democratic .society. It represents
a cancer in the body politic, a serious threat to democratic society,
regardless of the fact that it is presently limited to treatment of the
weaker members of the community. It is all the more challenging
because, if the police problem can be solved on the level of treatment
accorded underprivileged persons, it can be solved everywhere.
The underlying premise of the above discussion has been that sound
laws are important. But we are often told that police abuses are simply
a reflex of the public attitude and that it is futile to expect illegal
arrests, imprisonments, and the third degree tortures to disappear so
long as these practices are publicly condoned, indeed, expected.
There are at least three serious fallacies in that thesis. First, it is
mere guesswork to think that "the public" presents a unified, irrational,
prejudiced viewpoint. In fact, there is no "the public" in a democracy,
and the slightest scrutiny reveals that many groups and organizations are
always and unalterably opposed to police brutality and other illegality.
Certainly it is both shortsighted and an unwarranted disparagement of
Americans to hold that police abuses are approved by the majority.
Second, the thesis will not bear scrutiny even with regard to offenses
which arouse considerable feeling-a brutal murder or a shocking rape.
For it is precisely in such situations that the policy of democratic methods
is put to the test. Here, that rational policy, developed in the hard school
of experience and the calm reflection of many years, directs police
and judges to stand firm against the emotional reactions of the moment.
rhetoric of thoughtless newspapers, comDespite public clamor and the
I
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petent police reveal the discipline of their profession as well as the
strength and validity of the democratic policy of police service.
Third, it is unsound to assume that police conduct is merely a
necessary effect of public attitudes, and that until the latter change, the
former will persist. The fact is that law can be deliberately and intelligently used to modify and create public attitudes. Indeed, the challenge
to the conscientious police official is precisely to use legal controls in such
ways as to alter unsound, undemocratic attitudes and misdirected emotions. There are many instances where judicial decisions and legislation,
vigorously enforced, have changed public opinion and initiated new
courses of conduct. 61 This does not imply that that can always be done,
especially with regard to petty blue rules whose enforcement is widely
opposed among law-abiding persons. But it does mean that in important
areas legal controls can initiate corrections in public beliefs and behavior.
We must remember, moreover, that law is not concerned with private
thoughts and emotions, but with conduct. Even if the police cannot
change public opinion they can help educate people to control their
emotions.
Our enlightened police Captain, like an artist having many brushes
and colors or like an engineer with a large assortment of tools and
instruments, has access to many legal controls which, if he employs them
skillfully and persistently, can effect enormous changes in conduct in
the direction of achieving democratic values. Certainly we must believe
that a thorough understanding of the police functions in a democratic
society, combined with a knowledge of law and of the facts comprising
serious social problems, necessarily operates to improve the quality of
police service. What is suggested, in effect, is abandonment of the
notion that the police function is purely negative, and the substitution
of a creative role designed to increase and expand the democratic values.
It is precisely in areas of race conflict and aggression that the challenge
to implement this perspective is greatest. By like token, here, too, is the
best opportunity for imaginative, disciplined police to make a major
contribution by strengthening the democratic way of life.
III
SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTY

The important police function of acquiring evidence to establish
guilt requires examination in relation to security and civil liberty. The
61. See Berger, The New York Law Against Discrimination: Operation and Administration,35 CoRNE . L.Q. 747 (1950).
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relevant issues bring to a climax the general thesis that the paramount
police function is to maintain order in ways that preserve and enlarge
democratic values. The unifying core of this area is speech, which has
been touched upon in connection with illegal threats and unlawful assembly. Democratic society rests on the fact that man is a speaking animal and on the rationality reflected in problem-solving by uncontrolled
discussion. With reference to ways of obtaining evidence and the relevant
privilege against self-incrimination, as well as the incidence of due process,
the basic liberty is freedom from coercion to speak. That freedom is the
counterpart of freedom to speak; both are necessary phases of freedom
of expression. By an analysis of police functions in relation to speech,
we may derive some understanding of the wider problem involving the
interrelations of security and civil liberty.
This general problem has sometimes been formulated in terms of an
opposition of values-security versus civil liberty. On the surface, at
least, it may seem persuasive that if any and all controls and methods
of securing evidence are used, order and security can be more effectively
preserved. So, too, at first blush it seems almost axiomatic that the
exercise of liberty necessarily involves the risk of disorder. But if the
inquiry is considered not abstractly, but with reference to our society,
opposing security to liberty is irrelevant.6 2 Harsh methods of control
and democracy are-incompatible; so-that the question becomes simply the
survival of democratic society. Thus, the basic postulate: A democracy,
like all other societies, needs order and security; but it also and equally
requires civil liberty. This complexity of need creates difficult theoretical
and practical problems.
If we limit our inquiry mainly to free speech, excluding from that
restricted area everything but cases involving racial and religious tensions, we still confront a tremendously difficult task in determining just
what the law is. Most of the important Supreme Court cases have been
6 to 3 or 5 to 4 decisions; thus there is doubt regarding the law and an
even greater uncertainty exists with respect to policies underlying the
decisions. What should the police do in this difficult, yet vitally important, area where the ultimate values of democracy, enshrined in the Bill
62. Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927), struck the pertinent note when he said: "Those who won our independence
. . . recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they
knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the
power of reason, as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by
law-the argument of force in its worst form."
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of Rights, are involved? The difficulty of the issues met when one
descends from airy generalizations to concrete situations is apparent, as
a discussion of a few cases in the area of racial and religious conflict
reveals.
Cantwell v. Connecticut6" represents an unsuccessful effort to curb
the speech of the Jehovah Witnesses, a minority sect which has abused
all organized religion, particularly Catholicism. - Cantwell, a Jehovah
Witness, went to a Catholic neighborhood and asked two pedestrians to
listen to his plionograph. He then played a record which singled out the
Catholic religion for especially offensive criticism. The pedestrians, both
of them Catholics, told Cantwell he had better get off the street before
something happened to him, and he walked away. His conviction of
inciting a breach of the peace was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court: "We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily
harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal
abuse." ". . . [T] he petitioner's commtication. .,. raised no such clear
and present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable to
conviction of the common law offense in question." 64
A similar case arose in Iowa in 1947.65 The Jehovah Witnesses
held open prayer meetings in a public park. After one such meeting,
threats of violence and many protests against future meetings were communicated to the mayor, police, and city council. The Council thereupon
passed an ordinance requiring its permission to hold meetings in the
park or on the public square. In an action to enjoin enforcement of the

ordinance, the Circuit Court held it to be unconstitutional as an infringement on the freedom of worship. The Court not only declared that the
Witnesses' activities could not be suppressed, but that in addition, they
were entitled to protection in the exercise of their religion.6 6
63. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

64. Id. at 310-311. In addition, the Court held the statute under which the defendant was also convicted, violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it required
a certificate for soliciting; this amounted to a prior restraint on the exercise of religion.

Id. at 303.
65. Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (1947).
66. Judge Sanborn said: "The theory that a group of individuals may be deprived
of their constitutional rights of assembly, speech and worship if they have become so
unpopular with, or offensive to, the people of a community that their presence in a
public park to deliver a Bible lecture is likely to result in riot and bloodshed, is
interesting but somewhat difficult to accept. Under such a doctrine, unpopular political,
racial, and religious groups might find themselves virtually inarticulate. Certainly the
fundamental rights to assemble, to speak, and to worship cannot be abridged merely

because persons threaten to stage a riot or because peace officers believe or are afraid
that breaches of the peace will occur if the rights are exercised.

"The only sound way to enforce the law is to arrest and prosecute those who
violate the law." Id. at 881-883.
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In still another Jehovah Witness case, 67 Chaplinsky had been distributing the literature of his sect on the streets of Rochester, N. H.
Many complaints were made to the city marshal "that Chaplinsky was
denouncing all religion as a 'racket'." The crowd at the busy traffic
intersection became restless and the officer on duty, without telling Chaplinsky that he was under arrest, started with him toward the police
station. On the way they met the marshal who was hurrying there on
information that a riot was under way. It was disputed whether the
marshal merely warned Chaplinsky of the threatening crowd or whether,
as Chaplinsky testified, the marshal cursed him. In any case, Chaplinsky
said to the marshal:

"You are a

.

. .

-damned racketeer"

and "a

damned fascist." He was tried and convicted of a misdemeanor for
uttering those words. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and
the constitutionality of the New Hampshire statute."" In a unanimous
opinion, rare in the civil liberties field, the Court said: "The statute, as
construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly
likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee. . . ." It added
that the constitutional privilege does not include ". . . the lewd and

obscene, the profane, the libelous, the insulting or 'fighting' wordsthose which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
69
immediate breach of the peace."
Two general guides may be derived from these cases. If speech is
the expression of a religious belief the fact that it is very offensive is
immaterial. And the fact that rioting is reasonably anticipated is no
ground to forbid or terminate a public meeting.
The Supreme Court's formula for speech which is not protected,
i.e., words which, in the Court's language, ".

.

. by their very utterance

inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,"-, 0 should
be kept in mind when considering the Terminiello case. 71 Terminiello,
speaking in a Chicago auditorium under the auspices of Gerald L. K.
Smith, had some very offensive things to say about Jews, some of whom
were in the audience. About 800 persons were inside the auditorium
67.

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).

68. The statute provided that "[nlo person shall address any offensive, derisive
or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place,
nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in
his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him
from pursuing his lawful business or occupation." N.H. REV. LAWs c. 378, § 2 (1942).
The Court, relying upon the New Hampshire court's interpretation, assumed without
holding, that the latter half of the statute was unconstitutional. Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
69. Id. at 572-573.

70. Id. at 572.
71. Terminiello v Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1948).
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while 1500 were outside, milling about, howling, and abusing those who
sought to enter, in some cases tearing their clothes. All the windows
were broken by rocks and stones, and bottles were being thrown into the
auditorium. Many tried to break down the doors, and the police were
having great difficulty in maintaining order outside the hall. Inside,
Terminiello harangued his audience about "atheistic, communistic Jewish
or Zionist Jews." He referred to "some of the slimy scum [who] got
in by mistake" and to "skunks of Jews." Referring to 15,000,000
persons who were murdered in Russia and to millions more who were
raped and sent into slavery, he cried: "That is what they want for you,
that howling mob outside." And, he added: "We will not be tolerant
of that mob out there. We are not going to be tolerant any longer."
There were shouts and exclamations from the audience: One yelled,
"[k] ill the Jews ;" another said, "Jews, niggers, and Catholics would have
to be gotten rid of." Thus you can visualize the situation and the tenor
of Terminiello's speech.
His conviction of disorderly conduct, affirmed by both the Appellate
and the Supreme Court of Illinois, was set aside by the United States
Supreme Court. One who considers only the language of the Chaplinsky
and other cases, i.e., that the First Amendment does not protect words
"which by their very utterance . . . tend to incite an immediate breach

of the peace," may have great difficulty in distinguishing Terminiello's
speech from the words used by Chaplinsky.7 2 But, whatever was in the
minds of the Justices, the ground for reversal was an erroneous instruction by the trial judge to the effect that the ".

.

. misbehavior may consti-

tute a breach of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute,
brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing
alarm." That, held the majority, is much too broad. 73 The curious fact
about this decision is that at no time in the proceedings from trial court
through three appellate courts, did the defendant raise any objection to
72. "The ways in which mob violence may be worked up are subtle and various.
Rarely will a speaker directly urge a crowd to lay hands on a victim or class of
victims. An effective and safer way is to incite mob action while pretending to deplore
it, after the classic example of Antony...." Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting Id. at 35.
73.

Mr. Justice Douglas, for the majority, stated:

".

.

. a function of free

speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve
its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
cballenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech,
though not absolute . . .is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment,
unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Terminiello v. Chi-

cago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1948).
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the judge's instruction. Accordingly, one may well be perplexed as to what
the Terminiello case holds. The Supreme Court split 5-4, and this underlines the doubt-would the same speech have been protected by the First
Amendment even if the trial judge had not improperly extended the
range of the ordinance in his instruction? And the difficulty of the
relevant question of policy may be indicated by noting that the interested
minority, groups were themselves divided in their attitude toward the
Terminiello case.7 4 In sum, we have at 5-4 decision about whose legal
meaning lawyers can very well reach diverse opinions and which raises
questions of policy much too difficult to be solved by mere reference to
democratic values.
It might be thought, in light of the above decisions, that no limits
can be placed on speakers, regardless of how insulting and offensive they
are, except as regards face-to-face fighting words and profane language.
And support of such an inference might be found in the case of Kunz v.
New York. 7 5
Kunz, an ordained Baptist preacher, had the effrontery, in public
talks in Columbus Circle in the heart of New York City, to call the Pope
"the anti-Christ," and Catholicism " a religion of the devil." Then, not
content with this attack on the religious sensibilities of millions of New
Yorkers, he denounced other millions of New Yorkers by calling the
Jews "Christ-killers" and saying: "All the garbage that didn't believe in
Christ should have been burnt in the incinerators. It's a shame they all
weren't." Because of these and similar remarks in past talks, his application for renewal of a permit was refused. Kunz proceeded to talk in
an open meeting, and was arrested and convicted of violating an ordinance requiring a permit to hold public worship meetings on the streets.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding the ordinance
unconstitutional on the ground that it gave the police power to control
in advance the right to speak on religious matters without specific limitations on the exercise of that power. Although a city may regulate the
use of public places, it may not forbid their use for legitimate purposes.
Mr. Justice Jackson, relying upon the Chaplin-sky case, dissented. He
argued that insulting or fighting words which tend toward an immediate
breach of the peace are not protected. In addition, he thought Kunz'
previous record of speaking was sufficient ground to refuse him a
permit. With regard to the alleged lack of standards in the New York
ordinance limiting the police Commissioner's power, Jackson retorted:
74. The American Jewish Congress supported the conviction and the American
Civil Liberties Union opposed it.

75. 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
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"It seems hypercritical to strike down local laws on their faces for want
of standards when we [i.e., the Supreme Court] have no standards.17 6
Kunz' conviction was for speaking without a permit, not for disorderly conduct or for inciting a breach of the peace. We are therefore
constrained to limit the decision to the validity of laws which control
religious speech in advance. The same toleration accorded Jehovah
Witnesses seems to have protected Kunz, too, though on different
grounds. With regard to any specific guides to the police, however, we
may note Mr. Justice Jackson's comment that, "this Court's prior decisions, as well as its decisions today, will be searched in vain for clear
standards by which it does, or lower courts should, distinguish legitimate
speaking from that acknowledged to be outside of constitutional protection."

77

On the same day that the Supreme Court decided the Kunz case, the
pendulum swung sharply in the direction of restriction of speech, for the
78
Court also rendered its decision in Feiner v. New York.
Feiner, a college student, spoke to a mixed white-Negro audience on
a street corner in Syracuse, urging attendance at a meeting of the Young
Progressives of America, to be addressed by John Rogge. Feiner called
the mayor of Syracuse "a bum," applied the same inelegant adjective to
President Truman and Mayor O'Dwyer, and he called the American
Legion "a Nazi Gestapo." It was found, though not with certainty, that
he also said that the Negroes "should rise up in arms and fight for their
rights." There was restlessness and some pushing among the crowd, but
no disorder. One man in the audience, who had his wife and children
with him, said to the police officers: "If you don't get that son of a bitch
off, I will go over and get him off there myself." The officers ordered
Feiner to stop speaking; when he refused, they arrested him. The conviction of disorderly conduct was affirmed by the Supreme Court 6-3.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson for the majority held that the speaker was
inciting a breach of the peace in urging Negroes to rise up in arms and
fight for equal rights, and that the arrest was justified in order to prevent
a fight. 79 But Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, placed his decision
76. Id. at 309.
77. Id. at 299.
78. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
79. ". . . [Tihere was no evidence," said the Chief Justice, "which could lend
color to a claim that the acts of the police were a cover for suppression of petitioner's
views and opinions.
. °. .

"It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the
suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when ashereT-the-speaker
passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes citement to riot, they
are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace." Id. at 319-21.
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on the ground that Feiner was interfering with traffic-since pedestrians
were forced to go around the crowd and into the street-hence his vote
for conviction does not go to the merits of the free speech issue. Mr.
Justice Black, dissenting, argued that the police should have protected
the speaker "even to the extent of arresting the man who threatened to
interfere."'8' And Mr. Justice Douglas warned: "If the police throw
their weight on the side of those who would break up the meetings, the
's
police become the new censors of speech."'
Finally, in the Beauharnais case,8 2 such wide restrictions were imposed as to raise very serious questions regarding the preservation of
civil liberties. In this case, a conviction for violating a group libel
statute 83 was upheld 5-4. Beauharnias passed out leaflets in a Chicago
street, purporting to be a petition to the Mayor and City Council, in
which statements were made regarding criminal attacks, "invasion, harrassment and encroachment by the Negroes," and that "communism is rife
among the Negroes."8s 4

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing the majority

opinion, relied on the common law precedent of criminal libel of an
individual, saying, ". . . we cannot deny to a State power to punish the
same utterance directed at a defined group. . . ." And he recited the

formula of the Cantwell and Chaplinsky cases regarding "the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting words."8' 5
Recall the words used by Terminiello and Kunz, and you will meet some
of the many problems that arise in any effort to use this formula in
specific situations or to reconcile the decisions by reference to it.
80. Id. at 321-329.
81. Id. at 331.
82. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 S. Ct. 725 (1950).
83. The statute made it unlawful ". . . to exhibit in any public place . . . any
lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which . . . portrays depravity,
criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed
or religion, which . . . exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to
contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots."
ILL. Rzv. STAT. c. 38, §471 (1951). For a discussion, pro and con, of group libel
legislation, see 1 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COaMUNICATION C. 5 (1947). Also
see REP. PRES. COM.rM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS 52 (1947).
84. The petition contained an application for membership in the White Circle
League of America, Inc., and further stated that "[i] f persuasion and the need to prevent
the white race from becoming mongrelized by the Negro will not unite us then the
aggressions ...rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the Negro surely will."
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 S. Ct. 725, 740 (1952).
85. "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libeldus and the insulting
of 'fighting' words .. .such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighted by the social interest in order and morality." Id. at
730-731.
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All the dissenting justices in the Beauharnaiscase agreed with the
majority that the defendant's conduct was reprehensible. But they
nonetheless voted to hold the statute unconstitutional because of its
vagueness and the consequent unlimited range for censorship of books,
newspapers, and the theater. The possibility of abusive police control
on a vast scale was the ground of disagreement, rather than the specific
facts in the Beauharnais case. For example, Mr. Justice Reed emphasized key words in the Illinois statute--"virtue," "derision," "obloquy"and the absence of cases precisely defining those terms. He pointed out
that philosophers through the ages have debated the meaning of "virtue."88 Mr. Justice Douglas found in this and other recent decisions
abridging speech ". . . . an ominous and alarming trend. The free
trade in ideas which the Framers of the Constitution visualized disappears. ' 1ST And Mr. Justice Black was even more emphatic in his dissent.
"The statute," he said, "imposes state censorship over the theater, moving
pictures, radio, television, leaflets, magazines, books and newspapers. No
doubt the statute is broad enough to make criminal the 'publication, sale,
presentation or exhibition' of many of the world's great classics, both
secular and religious." And he ended his opinion on an ominous note:
"If there be minority groups who hail this holding as their victory, they
might consider the possible relevancy of this ancient remark: 'Another
such victory and I am undone.' "88
What are we to make of these decisions so far as police service in
a democracy is concerned? On one point there should be general agreement: Although the situations involving the First Amendment are
infrequent as compared with the everyday work of the police, the issues
they raise are of paramount importance. Perhaps there are those who
can believe that Supreme Court decisions are immediately reflected in
the conduct of officials; but we have only to note that the third degree
has long been subjected to the severest judicial condemnation, to perceive
the fallacy of such optimism and, thus, to recognize our dependence
upon the integrity of the police. Indeed, the correct solution of these
crucial issues depends upon the police more than upon any other group
in our society.
86. Id. at 743.
87. "Tomorrow," he said, "a Negro will be hailed before a court for denouncing
lynch law in heated terms. Farm laborers in the west who compete with field hands
drifting up from Mexico; whites who feel the pressure of orientals; a minority which
finds employment going to members of the dominant religious group-all of these are
caught in the mesh of today's decision." Id. at 745-746.
88. Id. at 740. Cf. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1951-1952, 20 U. OF
CHI. L. Rev. 1, 24-29 (1952); also see note, 61 YALE L.J. 252 (1952). The Chicago
Tribune on July 19, 1952, § 1, p. 7, col. 8 reported that the police censor board again voted
to ban Chicago showings of The Miracle "on the ground the film violates a city ordinance
providing a film cannot expose citizens of any religion to contempt."
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The Supreme Court decisions can provide only a bare outline of the
content of civil liberty, as the Justices themselves have repeatedly pointed
out. They are practically confined to the enunciation of broad policies.
It is the police who, within the vague contours of judicially suggested
constitutional privilege, carve out the concrete facts of civil liberty.8"
On the other hand, in some areas, even where the rules are relatively
precise, as in the exclusion of coerced confessions, the police can, and
often do, nullify the law by ignoring or flouting it. Furthermore, the
courts must take the cases as they come to them. The police exercise an
important law-making function, not as law-declaring officials, but as
suppliers of the fact-situations which form the occasions for, and limit
the meaning of, the authoritative declarations of law. Accordingly,
whether we reason from the potentialities of general doctrines or realistically appraise the situation in terms of an effective remedy for police
transgressions, the analysis leads to one conclusion-the police possess
great powers to make civil liberties vital living facts or, contrariwise, to
restrict, injure and, perhaps, even destroy these basic values. One may
find an escape from this dependence only insofar as democratic standards
and the rule of law actually function to control the police.
The question which thoughtful police officials therefore face is this:
In this vague, conflicting field of civil liberties, when the Supreme Court
is often closely divided and where even members-of the minority groups
directly concerned take sharply opposed positions, what course of action
should be followed? If the theme of this paper makes sense, there can
be only one answer to that question, namely, protect society in ways
which preserve the values of democracy, among which those embodied
in the Bill of Rights are paramount. While this answer cannot provide
specific solutions for every police problem, it is not as imprecise as might
be imagined.
Among the values of democracy is the sovereignty, of law; and one
basic principle of our law in that criminal law must be strictly construed,
i.e., vagueness and ambiguity must be interpreted so as to exclude
doubtful cases from the orbit of penal laws. 90 The political ethic of democratic society also maximizes the value of civil liberty. Accordingly,
guided both by law and by democratic ethics, the job of the police is to
resolve doubts and difficulties in ways that permit civil liberties to
89. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 173 (1947).
said " . . . it is important to remember that police conduct is not often subjected to

judicial scrutiny. Day by day mischief may be done and precedents built up in
practice long before the judiciary has an opportunity to intervene."
90. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRITMINAL LAw c.2 (1947).
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flourish. 91 This does not oppose the standard that the police must
enforce definite law impartially and regardless of their private opinion
of its merits. But what is the law is very often uncertain, especially in
the civil liberties field. In those cases the law that must be enforced is
the narrow, strict interpretation of the relevant statutes and decisions.
If the police were to follow the general language of Supreme Court
decisions which have upheld restrictions on freedom of speech, our
democracy would be grievously imperiled. But if the police follow the
narrow path of strict construction, they will avoid damage to civil liberty.
And they may also succeed in curbing the hate-mongers, who ought to
be punished for their vicious harms.
In arriving at a sound interpretation of heir duties and functions
the police would be well advised to keep their eyes on the facts in the
adjudicated cases and either to ignore the broad judicial language as
dicta or to give it only that breadth which the facts definitely require.
If plainly obscene language is used, if there is a man-to-man insult in
terms of common fighting words, or if there is direct incitement immediately to commit a definite crime, the duty to arrest the speaker is clear.
But short of such situations unmistakably manifested, the job of the
police is to maintain order while the fanatics howl. The presence of a
calm officer protecting even such speakers from the attack of hostile
listeners-although the policeman's personal opinions and feelings are
those of the audience--provides an eloquent lesson in the method of
democracy.
With reference to the problems of race tension and violence, it is
evident that difficult decisions must be made. If we think solely in terms
of a vicious agitator who wishes to arouse mob action against defenseless,
members of a minority group, there is every reason to curb his offensive
speech by whatever means are necessary to do that. Indeed, if we concentrate solely on immediate objectives, even the tamer varieties of
obviously false, anti-democratic speech should be forbidden. But the
problem is much too complex for such simple solutions, however appealing they may be at the particular moment. Sometimes the mob, itself,
is largely composed of members of a minority, as may have been true
in the Terminiello case. Sometimes a minority may be the aggressor,
at least on the level of insult and abuse, e.g., the Jehovah Witnesses.
But the major difficulty met in curbing speech results from the impact
91. "They [police administrators] are inclined to look upon the constitutional provisions not as measures protecting the liberties of the citizen, but more as obstacles to
confound and obstruct the law enforcement officer in his daily tasks." Kooken, Postwar
Influence Upon Criminal Investigations, 35 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 426, 428 (1945).
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of the basic values of democracy. Suppressing a hate-monger is only
a small aspect of that problem and should not be-permitted to obscure
the enduring importance of the Bill of Rights, especially for minorities.
The fact that police should lean backwards in toleration of speech
does not imply that they must have no opinion about the speech or that
they should not distinguish good from evil, vicious talk. The police
know who hate-mongers and their gang are. They can be on the lookout
for the inevitable occasions when those anti-democratic agitators and
their agents take to action or threaten to do so. And they can be ready
to arrest them the instant they pass beyond the protected realm of speech
and resort to overt conduct that clearly violates the criminal law. What
has been proposed regarding racial and religious tensions comes, in a
word, to this: As to speech, be tolerant, and arrest a speaker only when
it is practically certain that this talk violates a criminal law.
The principles implicit in the above conclusions regarding the police
function in certain situations involving freedom of speech should be
applied to the entire sphere of civil liberty. Accordingly, only some
distinctive aspects of search, seizure, and self-incrimination are pertinent
here.
A serious legal problem concerns arrest in a house or business
establishment followed by search in the area which is under the arrestee's
control. 2 Another seriously disputed point involves the opportunity to
obtain a search warrant although the reasonableness of the search following a lawful arrest is admitted. Although a majority of the Supreme
Court has recently held that the reasonableness of the search, and not
3
reasonable opportunity to secure a search warrant, is the requirement,0
it is evident that the police frequently can, if they wish, satisfy the higher
standard of the minority justices without loss in efficiency. Here, in the
search and seizure area, another definite standard emerges to guide democratic police. If there is opportunity to secure a search warrant, the
police should get one. There is certainly no police obligation to satisfy
only the minimum legal requirements. They must conform to law but
where there are several legal avenues, the police are free to take any of
them. That a search is legal if it is reasonable, despite the fact that there
was opportunity to obtain a search warrant, does not therefore require the
police to omit search warrants in such cases. Instead, the duty of the
police in our kind of society requires them to follow that legal course
which conforms most to democratic values.
92.
93.

Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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This is confirmed when we realize the importance of the guaranty
against illegal search and seizure. "The security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police . . . is basic to a free society."194 Long
ago, in England, the general warrant collided unsuccessfully with the
deeply ingrained attitude that a man's home is his castle. And in this
country, the flagrant trespasses of the King's officers were among the
major causes of the Revolution.
If we keep that in mind, we will not be confused by the conflict in
rules and the sharp differences of opinion regarding the admission of
95
evidence acquired by unlawful search and seizure. The federal courts
and 17 states exclude such evidence, while the rest of the states admit
°
it.9
Those who insist that the illegally acquired evidence should be
admitted argue that (1) otherwise, any blundering policeman could
destroy the possibility of convicting major criminals, e.g., by illegally
seizing the gun from which the fatal bullet was fired; (2) the criminal,
not the innocent, benefits because the evidence is found in the former's
possession; (3) relevant evidence offered in court should not be barred
on the collateral ground that it was illegally obtained; (4) to exclude
the evidence means that two criminals-the defendant and the officerescape, whereas both or, at least, one of them should be punished; and
(5) remedies, civil and criminal, against the offending officers are
available.
The proponents of the rule of exclusion argue that the occasional
escape of a criminal is a small price for safeguarding the sanctity of the
home. They also emphasize the impotence of the legal remedies against
police officers; the State's Attorney who approved or ordered an illegal
search and seizure is not likely to prosecute the policeman who acted
with his consent or under his direction. And civil action for damages,
as has been shown, is more in the realm of paper law than in that of
effective relief. In short, exclusion of the evidence, it is argued, is the
97
only actual deterrent of illegal search and seizure.
To these arguments there may be added another regarding the
contention that the admission of illegally obtained evidence is necessary
for efficient law-enforcement. That claim, which seems to imply a dependence on official lawlessness, is certainly not supported by the record
94. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
95. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ; FED.R. CRIm. P. 41 (e).
96. See Appendix, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39 (1949). Also see Note,

Admissibility in State Courts of Evidence Obtained by Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures, 35 MINN. L. REv. 457 (1951).
97. The rationale of the federal rule was discussed by Mr. Justice Murphy in
his dissenting opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949).
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of federal prosecutions, which shows an extremely high percentage of
convictions. This may perhaps be explained on the ground of superior
police service, but it may also be true that such service is stimulated
by the federal rule excluding evidence acquired by illegal search and
seizure. Nor is it apparent that law enforcement in those states which
exclude such evidence lags behind that in the states which admit it.
This problem merits careful socio-legal research to determine whether
efficiency in law-enforcement is actually sacrificed when the rules exclude
evidence secured by illegal search and seizure."
The police officer's problems frequently require a choice to be made
between speedy solution of a crime by methods which violate the Constitution (even though in his jurisdiction the courts will admit the evidence), and a delayed solution in order to get the necessary evidence
lawfully. These situations are distinguishable from those where search
warrants can be secured. If competent methods of detection are patiently
pursued, a suspect can often be caught in the act of committing a crime
or he can be found in a room working with the instrumentalities and
evidence of his criminal vocation, e.g., in gambling, so that an arrest
at that time does not require ransacking an entire house to get the
evidence. More difficult problems are posed where the police are dealing
not with professional criminals but with a person who has committed
a single major offense. Here the temptation is great to seize the hidden
gun or the stolen property immediately. Even in these situations, however, there is often nothing to prevent one officer from keeping the
suspect under surveillance while another goes for the search warrant.
Besides, in dealing with a person who has committed a single offense,
the training and resourcefulness of the police should more than compensate for the delay in acquiring specific evidence. In sum, if professional criminals, for example, dealers in narcotics, are involved, it
is usually possible to secure a search warrant or, if there is patience and
skillful detection, to arrest them at a strategic time and place; while
in the cases of amateurs, except for those attempting to flee the jurisdiction, the police can normally solve their crimes without resorting
to illegal searches and seizures. That, at least, is a fair inference from
the enforcement records of states which follow the exclusionary rule.
98. In a recent New York case, Judge Frank Oliver wrote: "The police do not
bother about getting warrants. They all know the rules of evidence, so laugh at the
Constitution . . . [t]he case at bar is merely a mild example of how the liberties of
New Yorkers are destroyed by the police and the courts. The rules of evidence subordinate the courts to a lawlessness of the police. We are supposed to ratify the boldest
and most lawless type of rough-house the police engage in." People v. Reilly, 105
N.Y.S.2d 845 (1951).
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Finally, the gap between the opposing rules could be narrowed by
maintaining discipline in the police, departments and by providing effective remedies for the illegal conduct of police. Such discipline and
legal controls would be strong deterrents of illegal search and seizure,
reducing the present need for the exclusionary rule.99 This emphasizes
again that it is daily discipline, thoughtful conduct, and legal control of
the police which are of decisive importance.
Throughout this paper and especially in comparing the police of
dictatorships with that of democratic societies, it has been impossible to
avoid aspects of the "third degree." The "third degree" is simply a
new name for an ancient practice-the torture of suspected offenders.
Its use by officers of the law in our society is a paradox which threatens
the very foundations of democracy. Accordingly, it is no accident that
the third degree involves all the questions which have been discussedthe distinctive characteristics of democratic police, the efficacy of legal
remedies for abuses by officials, the disadvantageous position of minorities and underprivileged persons, the dependence of sound action in
riots and other crises upon the quality of everyday police conduct, and
the heightening of all these issues in the area of civil liberties. The
interconnectedness of these problems is revealed in the fact that police
who brutalize law-enforcement to the point of torturing suspects are
hardly apt to respect civil liberties.
The exclusion of forced confessions from the evidence has been
traditionally rested on the untrustworthiness of such statements. 10 0 It
is clear, however, in recent Supreme Court decisions, that an additional
reason is the gross violation of personality which offends the sense of
democratic justice regardless of the fact that the truth of the confessions is established by further investigation.' 0 ' In short, the exclusionary
rule is also a negative application of the value of free speech. 0 2
Recent Supreme Court opinions have gone far beyond the exclusion
of involuntary confessions to the point of condemning police inter99. Cf. "Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective
way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this court to condemn as falling
below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance
upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective." Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949). (emphasis added.)
100. 3 WIGMORE, EviDETcE § 815 et seq. (3rd ed. 1940).
101. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 94 (1949); Ashcraft v. United States, 327
U.S. 274 (1946) ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
102. The consistency of admitting real evidence acquired by coerced confessions
while excluding evidence secured by illegal search and seizure, as well as other methods
that offend a sense of justice, and thus violate due process merits analysis. See Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), where the forcible use of a stomach pump to
extract narcotic capsules was held to violate the due process clause.
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rogations conducted "out of the presence of friends and relatives."
These cases compel us to face the fact that sometimes judicial decisions,
if they do not aggravate present difficulties, do not contribute appreciably to their solution. 10 3 For example, whatever view one takes of the
McNabb rule-that a confession obtained during illegal detention with04
out the slightest coercion, physical or psychological, is inadmissible
-the unfortunate fact is that the rule widens the gap between law and
police practices. And the dubious efficacy of dealing with serious
abuses indirectly, by a rule of evidence, again emphasizes the need of
actual remedies for harms committed by officials as well as of discipline
and better training of the police.
In considering ways out of the impasse, two facts must be taken
as settled. On the one hand, private interrogation of suspects immediately after their arrest is essential in any system of effective detection.
And, at the same time, one cannot avoid the duty to subject law-enforcement, including interrogation, to democratic ideals. This is precisely
the kind of problem which the common law and democratic institutions
have often demonstrated remarkable competence to solve. Even without
the aid of relevant factual studies the prevalent confusion created by
the McNabb, Upshaw, and Gallegos cases can certainly be sharply diminished. 10 5 If there is anything novel about the solution of this problem, which the general thesis of this discussion suggests, it is that a
fuller understanding of the third degree depends upon our viewing
it persistently in relation to police functions in a democratic society.
Finally, we have but to lift our eyes from that specific configuration
of facts and values to encounter the principal issues confronting democratic society all over the world. The maintenance of order requires
the use of experts and professionals who, if democracy is to survive,
must themselves be subordinated to popular control. Without the experts
we cannot solve the difficult problems of aggression in modern society.
But unless the experts are subjected to the rule of law and other forms
of popular control, they become an insensitive 6lite. The society is then
subjected to so-called scientific, but assuredly not democratic, treatment.
The illegal use of physical force by officers of the. law is the most
dramatic exhibition of what is involved in this vital issue. That is why
the theme of this paper, though focused on the relatively narrow ques103. Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL.

L. Ray. 442 (1948).
104. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
105. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948). But cf. Gallegos v. Nebraska,
342 U.S. 55 (1951).
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tion of police functions, may have general significance for the paramount problem of our times.
That problem, whose solution is epitomized as the universal sovereignty of law, concerns the maintenance of world order by methods
which are compatible with democratic values. It is precisely the police
problem of every democratic society, "writ large." For solution of the
world problem, we depend upon the experience and skills acquired in
the smaller communities. Not many persons can participate directly in
international affairs. But every thoughtful person can contribute to
the solution of the universal problem, as well as to that of those problems which touch him intimately in his particular locality, by helping to
make police service in his neighborhood a truer instrument of the enduring values of democratic society.
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